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I. INTRODUCTION

The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) uses grade
standards to uniformly characterize the quality and condition of agricultural
commodities.' The standards are promulgated by the USDA's Agricultural

* Michael T. Olexa is a Professor and Director of the UF/IFAS Center for Agricultural
and Natural Resource Law. He received his Ph.D. in Plant Pathology from the
University of Florida and J. D. from Nova Southeastern University. R. Ben Lingle is
an associate at Oliver Maner LLP in Savannah, Georgia. He works in the litigation
department of the firm. Mr. Lingle received his J. D. and a certificate in Environmental
and Land Use Law from the University of Florida Levin College of Law. Damian C.
Adams holds a Ph.D. in Food and Resource Economics and a J. D. from the University
of Florida. He is an assistant professor of Natural Resource Economics and Policy in
the School of Forest Resources and Conservation at the University of Florida.
Kimberly Stewart is a recent graduate of the University of Florida Levin College of
Law and has a Masters Degree in Applied Economics from Florida State University.
1. Fresh Fruit, Vegetable, Nut and Specialty Crop Grade Standards, U.S.
Department of Agriculture Agricultural Marketing Services, http://www.ams.usda.
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Marketing Services (AMS) division in consultation with farming industry
groups.2 Emphasizing produce attributes such as surface defects, shape,
cleanliness, color, maturity, and decay,3 grade standards improve the
marketability of agricultural commodities by establishing a common
industry language for use in contracts. Use of such a language enables
wholesale buyers to know the quality of commodities without first having
to inspect them, thus facilitating trade by lowering transaction costs. 5
Though agricultural grade standards describe many attributes of
agricultural commodities, the standards do not typically include
information about the pesticides used in commodity production and
packaging. 6 Labeling for certain production and processing standards exist
(e.g., 100% organic, kosher, all natural), but these provide no information
about any pesticide residues that may remain on the commodities.7 This
hampers consumers from expressing preferences for commodities grown
with fewer pesticides. 8 Additionally, because grade standards and labels
disregard pesticide residues, there is little incentive for producers to limit
exposure of pesticides that prevent costly cosmetic damage. 9
The notion that cosmetically-driven grade standards incentivize high
pesticide use is not a new observation.1o On July 30, 1992, the Senate
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry conducted hearings on
the link between cosmetic standards and pesticide use." Senators from

gov/AMSv1.0/ams.fetchTemplateData.do?template=TemplateN&navlD=U.S.GradeSta
ndards&rightNavl=U.S.GradeStandards&topNav-&leftNav-&page=FreshGradeStand
ardslndex&resultType=&acct-freshgrdcert (last visited Aug. 16, 2012). [hereinafter
Fruitand Vegetable Market News]
2. Id.

3. NICHOLAS J. POWERS & RICHARD G. HEIFNER, FEDERAL GRADE STANDARDS
FOR FRESH PRODUCE: LINKAGES TO PESTICIDE USE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., EcON.
RESEARCH SERV. iv (1991) [hereinafter FederalGrade Standards].
4.
Thomas Reardon, Jean-Marie Codron, Lawrence Busch, James Bingen, & Craig
Harris, Global Change in Agrifood Grades and Standards: Agribusiness Strategic

Responses in .Developing Countries, 2 Int'l Food and Agribusiness Mgt Rev. 421, 427
(2001).
5.

FederalGrade Standards, supra note 3, at 7.

6.
7.

Id. at 18.
Id.

8.
9.

Id.
Id.
See ERIK LICHTENBERG,

10.
GRADING STANDARDS AND PESTICIDES IN THE
ECONOMICS OF REDUCING HEALTH RISK FROM FOOD, PROCEEDINGS OF NE-165
CONFERENCE, JUNE 6-7, 1995, WASHINGTON, D.C. 91 (Julie A. Caswell, ed.), available
at http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/25961/1/nel65cO6.pdf.
11. See generally Cosmetic Standards and Pesticide Use on Fruitsand Vegetables:
Hearing on S.102-853

Before the S. Comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition, and

Forestry,102nd Cong. (1992) [hereinafter Cosmetic StandardsHearing]
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farming states, the Administrator of the USDA's AMS, representatives
from industry groups such as the American Farm Bureau, and
representatives from advocacy groups such as the Natural Resource
Defense Council provided wide-ranging opinions on the link and varying
positions on whether there was cause for concern.12 The Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA)," the USDA 1 4 and the AMS 15 also issued reports
on the subject; however, the reports lacked rigorous analysis and offered
vague policy alternatives.16
Grade standards also fail to take into account fertilizer applications
used during commodity production, which create many of the same issues
as pesticides.17 Fertilizers such as nitrogen, phosphorous, and potassium
help crops achieve optimum size in less time, helping producers achieve
higher yields per acre of farmland.18 Grade standards often include
specifications for commodity size.' 9 The demand for higher yields and the
necessity of producing commodities in conformance with grade standards
incentivize producers to maintain high levels of fertilizer application.
Among other concerns, excessive fertilizer applications exacerbate
problems with non-point source runoff that leads to water quality
problems.20 Similar to the link between pesticide use and grade standards,
the USDA's failure to consider fertilizer use as a component of grade
standards has led to standards that ignore key commodity attributes and
environmental externalities that many consumers find important. 2 1

12.
13.

Id.
U.S. ENvT'L PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF PLANNING, POLICY, AND EVALUATION,

AN OVERVIEW OF FRUIT AND VEGETABLE STANDARDS
APPEARANCE AND PESTICIDE USE (1992).

RELATING TO COSMETIC

FederalGrade Standards, supra note 3.
NEILSON C. CONKLIN & PAMELA A. MISCHEN, QUALITY STANDARDS AND
PESTICIDE USE: A REVIEW OF LITERATURE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., AGRIC. MARKETING
SERV. (1992).
14.
15.

16.

Lichtenberg, supra note 10.

17. See generally GRADING, CERTIFICATION, AND VERIFICATION, U.S. DEP'T OF
AGRIC., AGRIC. MARKETING SERV., http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSvl.0/Standards (last
visited Sept. 3, 2012); see also S.R. Carpenter et al., Nonpoint Pollution of Surface
Waters with Phosphorousand Nitrogen, 8 ECoL. APPL. 559 (1998).
18. John Jennings & Leo Espinosa, Arkansas Nutrient Management Planner's
Guide 3-1, http://www.amatural.org/environmental management/water/nutrient
mgmt/planners guide/chapter3.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2012).
19. For information on grade standards for particular commodities, see GRADING,
CERTIFICATION, AND VERIFICATION, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., AGRIC. MARKETING SERV.,
http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSvl.0/Standards (last visited Sept. 3, 2012).
20. Carpenter et al., supra note 17.
21. Jason J. Czamezki, The Future of Food Eco-Labeling: Organic, Carbon
Footprint, and Environmental Life-cycle Analysis, 30(3) STANFORD ENV. LAW J. 4
(2011).
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This Article explores the possibility of lowering cosmetic grade
standards to incentivize producers to use fewer pesticides and fertilizers,
examines the potential negative side effects of reduced pesticide use, and
proposes ways to adjust the USDA's approach to setting grade standards.
Reduced pesticide and fertilizer use may lead to less non-point source
pollution, fewer hazards to farm laborers, lower levels of pesticide residue
left on commodities, lower production costs, and the opportunity to
develop niche markets to provide consumers a more economical alternative
to organic produce. However, lowering grade standards could result in
poor quality produce. Less pesticide use could also affect food safety by
increasing the likelihood that commodities will contain hazardous
mycotoxins. Of particular concern is the risk that lowering grade standards
could result in increased aflatoxin levels in raw commodities headed to
market. Aflatoxins and other mycotoxins are valid causes for concern, and
the USDA should not lower grade standards without first assuring that
these scenarios do not occur. Readjusting grade standards to levels high
enough to prevent mycotoxin infestation, yet low enough to facilitate
diminished pesticide and fertilizer use, could provide producers and
consumers more flexibility and lower costs.
Following this Introduction, Part II provides a history of grade
standards and their enabling legislation. Part III provides a history of
federal marketing orders, which allow producers to establish standards and
grades that bind other producers and processors in a geographic area, and
how their implementation has historically promoted goals not always in
line with environmental concerns. Part IV discusses the importance of
grade levels and food safety with respect to mycotoxins, with particular
emphasis on aflatoxins. Part V discusses the possible effects of lowering
grade standards on pesticide and fertilizer use, in particular the opportunity
to develop niche markets of "ecolabeled" products. Part VI discusses the
benefits of lowering grade standards. Part VII discusses how the increased
vertical integration and globalization of agricultural commerce may tend to
diminish the importance and influence of grade standards. Agricultural
conglomerates often dictate the standards their producers must meet. As
these conglomerates take up more and more of the production market, their
internal standards begin to spill over and have an effect on the broader
market for the particular commodity. If private industry standards require
stringent cosmetic standards, many producers will continue to produce to
those specifications, resulting in sustained pesticide use, regardless of
potentially lowered grade standards. Conversely, if agribusinesses see
potential in the production and marketing of "ecolabeled " products, private
industry standards fortified by vertical integration could work in favor of
the niche market development discussed in Part V. Part VIII concludes that
the lowering of grade standards would be no panacea, but it could result in
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significantly decreased pesticide use and is a policy worth further
exploring.
II. GRADE STANDARDS
The federal government first entered the field of agricultural
commodity grading in 1912,22 when the congressionally-enacted Sulzer
Bill established standard apple barrel dimensions and grades for barreled
apples.23 In 1915, Congress asked the USDA to begin issuing market
reports on the price and movement of agricultural commodities. 24 This
move furthered the need for a nation-wide communication of commodity
quality to go along with the existing nation-wide communication of
commodity prices. 25 The next federal move came two years later when
Congress passed the Food Production Act of 1917 (FPA).26 Prompted by
an increase in long-distance agricultural commerce and the need to provide
quality food for American soldiers fighting in the First World War, the
FPA authorized the USDA to implement national grading and inspection
standards for fresh fruits and vegetables.27
Following the end of the Second World War, the USDA turned its
attention to rural training and partnered with states and land-grant colleges
to study the scientific and economic aspects of the nation's agricultural
problems.2 8 This resulted in the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946
(AMA) and the Research and Marketing Act of 1946 (RMA), which
together expanded the federal government's role in agricultural marketing,
The AMA combined
transportation, distribution, and research.29
agricultural commodity grading, marketing research and news, and various
other agricultural marketing functions into a single USDA agency30 to
22. Carolyn Dimitri, Contract Evolution and Institutional Innovation: Marketing
Pacific-Grown Apples from 1890 to 1930, 62 THE J. OF EcON. HISTORY 189, 201

(2001).
23.
24.

Id.
Fruit and Vegetable Market News, supra note 1. The USDA first reported on

strawberry market conditions in Louisiana. By the end of 1915, the USDA was
collecting and distributing agricultural market information from year-round terminals
in New York City, Chicago, Saint Louis, Kansas City, Buffalo, and Baltimore and from
seven seasonal terminals. Id.
25.
26.
27.

FederalGrade Standards, supra note 3, at 1.
Id.
Id.

28.

S. Comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, Members, Jurisdiction, and

History, Chapter 5: War, Peace, and Prosperity: 1940 - 1959, S. Doc. No. 105-24

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CDOC-105sdoc24/html/ch5.html
(1825-1998)
(last visited Sept. 3, 2012).
29.
30.

Id.
FederalGrade Standards,supra note 3, at 1.
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provide "an integrated administration of all laws enacted by Congress to
aid the distribution of agricultural products through research, market aids
,,31
and services, and regulatory activities . . . ."
AMA § 203(c) directs and authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture "to
develop and improve standards of quality, condition, quantity, grade and
packaging and recommend and demonstrate such standards in order to
encourage uniformity and consistency in commercial practices."3 2 Further,
§ 203(h) charges the Secretary "[t]o inspect, certify, and identify the class,
quality, quantity, and condition of agricultural products when shipped or
received in interstate commerce, under such rules and regulations as the
Secretary of Agriculture may prescribe." 33 Grading and inspection is
However, adherence is mandatory in certain
typically voluntary.34
situations, such as when federal marketing orders have established
minimum grades, when the agricultural commodities are sold to the federal
government, and for certain commodities in import and export.35 Further,
adherence to USDA grade standards is mandatory when such standards are
referenced in the contracts for sale.36 Packers may stamp produce
containers with USDA grade standards without having the produce
inspected; however, as with using the standards in contracts, stamping the
standards on containers makes adherence to the standards legally binding. 3
Packers must have the produce inspected if they are to stamp the USDA
shield on the containers. 3 8 These practices stem from the AMA's directive
that though the Secretary must develop grade standards, inspection must
occur only "under such rules and regulations as the Secretary of
Agriculture may prescribe."4 0

31.

7 U.S.C. § 1621 (2000).
32. Id. at 1622(c).
33. Id. at 1622(h)(1). As referenced in the statute, this authority is derived from
Congress' commerce powers, wherein "Congress shall have power To regulate
Commerce ... among the several States" U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
34.
35.
36.

Federal Grade Standards, supra note 3, at 10.
Id.
Id.

37. Id. 7 U.S.C. 1622(h)(4) ("Whoever knowingly shall falsely make, issue, alter,
forge, or counterfeit any official certificate, memorandum, mark, or other
identification . . . with respect to inspection, class, grade, quality, size, quantity, or
condition, issued or authorized under this section . . . , or whoever knowingly
represents that an agricultural product has been officially inspected or graded (by an
authorized inspector or grader) under the authority of this section when such
commodity has in fact not been so graded or inspected shall be fined not more than
$1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.")
38.

39.

Federal Grade Standards, supra note 3, at 10.

7 U.S.C. 1622(c).
40. 1622(h)(1).
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Though use of grade standards is discretionary in the majority of
agricultural commodity transactions, buyers and sellers oftentimes freely
choose to utilize the standards. 4 1 Grading is a convenient and reliable way
for sellers to communicate to buyers the quality of the bargained-for
commodities.42 Buyers may rely on the descriptions in the contract and
avoid incurring potentially high inspection costs. 4 3 As commodity
transactions through the twentieth century began to more frequently
involve long distance transactions, the need for precise and agreed upon
descriptions became evermore essential. In addition, sellers benefit from
national grade standards because they know buyers understand exactly
what they are purchasing." This leads to fewer contractual disputes, which
45
in turn leads to expedited transactions and reduced transaction costs.
Further, grading expedites dispute resolution in situations where it
does not prevent dispute in the first place.46 Should the purchased
commodity not meet the grade agreed upon in the contract, the buyer may
use the grade as the basis to argue that the seller breached the contract.4 7
Should the seller hold that the commodity does meet the agreed upon
grade, the seller may use the grade as a defense to the buyer's claim of
breach. 4 8 The grieved party may file a complaint with the USDA, who
through power vested to it pursuant to the Perishable Agricultural
Commodities Act (PACA) will formally or informally resolve such
disputes. 4 9 The use of grade standards allows the USDA's AMS to
objectively assess whether the commodity quality meets the standards
agreed upon in the contract.o
In addition to dispute avoidance and resolution, grade standards
facilitate price reporting, product development, and marketing and
processing technology." Grading puts "all parties on a more even footing,
where the qualities represented by reported prices are known and
understood by potential buyers." 52 When taken in conjunction with price
reporting, grading provides essential data about what prices will be paid for
commodities displaying particular attributes. This benefits both the
commodities industry and consumers, where the latter is able to
41.

FederalGrade Standards,supra note 3, at 10.

42.

Id. at 3.

43.

Id.

44.

Id. at 5.

45.
46.

Id.
Id.

47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51.

Id. at 3-5.

52.

Id. at 3.
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communicate to the former what is desired and what should be delivered to
market.
Grading results in standardization of agricultural commodities, which
allows for the standardization of the equipment used to package, process,
and ship commodities.53 Equipment is developed to handle a fixed quantity
of produce at a fixed size; variance reduces efficiency and increases
packaging and transportation costs. 54 Packaging is developed to prevent
bruising of commodities at a fixed level of maturity and firmness.ss
Variance from these levels results either in bruised commodities or
unnecessarily protective packaging, again reducing efficiency and
increasing packaging and transportation costs. 56
A final benefit provided by grade standards is commodity
differentiation.57 The majority of fresh fruits and vegetables move through
the market and arrive on a grocery store shelf without brand
identification.58 It is in producers' interest that sub-par commodities do not
reach the market because, without brand identification, the sub-par
commodity reflects poorly on the commodity in general, rather than on the
specific producer who grew the commodity. 59 The ability to foreclose subpar commodities from the market can occur only when all producers
participate in the grading, which is a strong incentive for producers to push
for a marketing order with grade standards. 6 0 The use of grade standards in
marketing orders is discussed in Part III below.

53.
54.

Id at 4.
Id.

55.

Id.

56.

Id.

Steven A. Neff & Gerald E. Plato, FEDERAL MARKETING ORDERS AND FEDERAL
RESEARCH AND PROMOTION PROGRAMS, BACKGROUND FOR 1995 FARM LEGISLATION
57.

4, (1995).
5 8.

Id.

59. Id Traditionally, the emphasis on grade standards has been to homogenize and
standardize commodities. But in a 2001 article from the International Food and
Agribusiness Management Review, the authors noted that, "[t]he shift from "mass

markets" with broad commodities to markets with differentiated products and niches
serving the consumers with relatively high incomes induced a shift from broad to
differentiated [grades and standards]. Hence, the new role of [grades and standards] is
increasingly to develop and differentiate markets, with standards being used as strategic
tools for market penetration, system coordination, quality and safety assurance, brand
complementing, and product niche definition." Thomas Reardon, Jean-Marie Codron,
Lawrence Busch, James Bingen, & Craig Harris, Global Change in Agrifood Grades
and Standards: Agribusiness Strategic Responses in Developing Countries, 2 INT'L

421, 423-24 (2001).
See generally Neff& Plato, supra note 57.

FOOD AND AGRIBUSINESS MGMT. REV.

60.
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As of the time of this Article, the USDA lists more than 312 grade
standards for fruits, vegetables, and specialty crops. 6 1 These standards
specify the required physical attributes and the amounts of defects
permitted for each graded commodity.6 2 Higher standards typically require
not only higher quality and fewer defects, but also more specificity in the
required attributes. 63 Grades typically indicate attributes such as cleanness,
color, shape, size, maturity, and decay.64 Most of the standards concern
external attributes that can be evaluated without cutting into or tasting the
commodity. 5 However, destructive sampling is revuired to determine the
presence or absence of some required attributes. 6 Attributes such as
cleanness, color, shape, and size are easily observable.67 Other attributes,
such as discoloration, skin breaks, maturity, and invisible watercore may be
observable only to more experienced buyers.68
Though the majority of required attributes pertain to external qualities,
many external attributes indirectly correlate to the product's internal
attributes. 69 For example, size roughly correlates to a commodity's
maturity, whereas discoloration may give clues as to the extent of internal
decay of a commodity. 70 This latter correlation is of particular importance,
as commodities with surface defects may have a shorter shelf-life than
those without such defects, increasing both the possibility that the
commodity will decay while in storage or transit and that the consumer
may buy an unsatisfactory product that decays before the commodity is
consumed.
A report by the USDA Economic Research Service indicates that
defects limited to a commodity's surface may have less importance to
consumers if the skin is removed during preparation, whereas the

61. GRADING, CERTIFICATION, AND VERIFICATION, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., AGRIC.
MARKETING SERv., http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSvl.O/Standards (last visited Sept. 6,
2012).
62.

FederalGrade Standards, supra note 3, at 5. For example, fresh orange grade

standards reference: cleanness; color; shape; size; smoothness; ammoniation; bruises;

buckskin; caked melanose; creasing; green spots; hail injury; hard or dry skin; oil spots;
orchid thrip; pulled stems; rust mite/resetting; scab; scale; skin breakdown; scars; split,
rough, or protruding navel; sunburn; thorn scratches; and various fungal, viral, and
bacteriological decay. Id. at 14-15.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1, 7.
65. Id.at 5.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 7.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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importance will be heightened if the commodity is consumed whole.72
Producers may put different importance on particular surface defects.
While a consumer may be less concerned about a defect on an orange peel
because the peel is not eaten, a producer may be quite concerned about
such a defect because of knowledge that the pest causing the defect may
decrease yield.
Due to the typically voluntary nature of adherence to grade standards,
parties to an agricultural commodity transaction may choose to use the
federal standard as a base rather than an exact contract term.74 For
example, a contract may stipulate that the bargained-for commodity must
meet the federal grade standard except that each piece must be
approximately A inches in diameter rather than the B inches stipulated in
the standard, or that only Y% of the batch may be bruised rather than the X
% stipulated in the standard. This allows parties to use federal grades as
reference points, enjoying the reliance provided by a shared national
language yet still exercising the flexibility needed to meet particular
needs. 76
In addition to federal grade standards, agricultural commodity quality
may be categorized, and possibly regulated, by state grade standards,
private industry standards, and marketing orders.77 States may choose to
promulgate standards to emphasize a regional preference that differs from
the national standard.78 The state standards may be stricter or laxer than the
corresponding federal standard. 7 9 Typically, federal regulations set a floor
rather than a ceiling. In most areas of regulation, state authorities are
permitted to have more stringent standards but would not ordinarily be
permitted to have standards laxer than a corresponding federal standard.
However, as discussed, the USDA's grade standards are not mandatory
unless falling within a few narrow exceptions.so The discretionary nature
of grade standards allows states, if they so choose, to set corresponding
standards below the federal "floor" set by the USDA.8 '
A particular firm may have quality preferences that differ from
federal and state standards, and accordingly may choose to develop private

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

77.
78.
79.

80.
81.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 10.
See id. at 13.
Id.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id.

See supranotes 28-29 and accompanying text.
Id.; see also Federal GradeStandards, supra note 3, at 11.
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standards for its suppliers. 82 If the firm controls a significant market share
of a raw commodity, its internal preferences may influence the standards
used across an entire region or industry. 83 Lastly, if a commodity is subject
to a federal marketing order or marketing agreement, minimum grade
standards may be legally enforceable.84 This segues into Part III, a
discussion of federal marketing orders, their history, and their effects on the
agricultural industry.
III. MARKETING ORDERS
The AMA's expansion and consolidation of the USDA's agricultural
marketing functions followed several decades of increased federal
involvement in agriculture. Roosevelt's New Deal ushered in such
legislation as the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 19338' (AAA of 1933),
the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 193786 (AMAA), and the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 193887 (AAA of 1938). The AAA of 1933,
considered to be the nation's first modern farm bill, aimed to reduce
agricultural surplus and raise prices by paying farmers to leave portions of
their fields fallow.88 The AAA of 1938 amended and restructured portions
of the AAA of 1933 that had been rendered unconstitutional by the U.S.
Supreme Court in United States v. Butler.89 The intervening legislation,
1937's Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act (AMAA) 90, reenacted
marketing agreement provisions from the 1933 Act and instituted industryinitiated regulation of agricultural commodities in the form of federal
marketing orders. 9 1
Section 602 of the AMAA lays out the goals envisioned by the
Act's framers. Through its enactment, the 73rd Congress sought to:
(1) ... [E]stablish and maintain such orderly marketing
conditions for agricultural commodities in interstate
commerce

as

will

establish

[parity

prices] . . .

to

farmers ...

82.

FederalGrade Standards, supra note 3, at 11.

83. For a discussion on private grade standards and the effects on producers and
consumers, see generally Reardon et al., supranote 4, at 421-35.
84. Neff& Plato, supra note 57, at 2.
85. Pub.L. 73-10, 48 Stat. 31 (1933).
86. 7 U.S.C. 601-14, 671-674
87. Pub. L. No. 75-430, 52 Stat. 31 (1938).
88. See generally Pub.L. 73-10, 48 Stat. 31 (1933).
89. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
90. 7 U.S.C. 601-14, 671-674
91. Neff & Plato, supra note 57, at 2.
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(2)

[P]rotect the interest

of the consumer

[VOL. 8

by (a)

approaching the level of prices . . . declared to be the

policy of Congress to establish ... by gradual correction of
the current level . . . , and (b) authorizing no action ...

[for] maintenance of prices to farmers above the
[established] level ...
(3) [E]stablish and maintain such production research,
marketing research,

[] development projects . . . , []

container and pack requirements[,] [] minimum standards
of quality and maturity[,] and [] grading and inspection
requirements

for agricultural

commodities...

as will

effectuate [] orderly marketing ...
(4) [E]stablish and maintain such orderly marketing... as
will provide. . . an orderly flow of the supply [] to market
throughout its normal marketing season to avoid
unreasonable fluctuations in supplies and prices.
(5) [C]ontinue for the remainder of any marketing season
or ... year, such regulation pursuant to any order as will
tend to avoid a disruption of the orderly marketing of any
commodity. . 92
Congress authorized the USDA to establish and implement federal
marketing orders to achieve these goals. 9 3
Marketing orders are tools used to stabilize markets, standardize
quality, standardize packaging, regulate market flows, and support research
and development of particular agricultural commodities. 94
Once
established, they are binding on all agricultural handlers, which include
"processors, associations of producers, and others engaged in the handling
of any agricultural commodity." 95 After the USDA implements an order,
all handlers within the order's geographic jurisdiction are legally bound to
adhere to its provisions. 96 The USDA may also implement marketing
agreements, which function in the same way as marketing orders except
that the former bind only signatories.97 The USDA may enact marketing
92.

7 U.S.C. 602(l)-(5).

93.

7 U.S.C. 608.

94. See Federal Marketing Orders and Agreements: An Overview, National
Agricultural Law Center, http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/overviews/
marketingorders.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2012). See also OECD Glossary of
Statistical Terms, Marketing Orders, http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=1624
(last visited Sept.6, 2012).

95.

7 U.S.C. § 608(c)(1).

96.
97.

Neff& Plato, supra note 57, at 2.
Id.
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orders and agreements only on commodities authorized for orders by
Congress. 98 This list has grown over the years and currently covers twentytwo fruits and vegetables, several of which are governed by one of several
different marketing orders depending on the geographic origin of the
commodity. 99 The USDA also establishes marketing orders for milk,
though this is beyond the scope of this Article.10
The need for extensive regularity in agricultural marketing was a
result of the improvements in refrigerated rail transport of the late
Producers were now able to ship fruits and
nineteenth century.'
markets. 10 2 This new ability fostered
unreachable
vegetables to previously
a desire for producers to pool resources and to use the same terms in
transactions with packers and transporters. 1 03 Such activities seemed to
contravene the antitrust provisions of the Sherman Act' and the Clayton
Antitrust Act. 05 However, the Capper-Volstead Act of 1922106 granted
agricultural producers the right to form voluntary cooperative associations
and exempted producers from antitrust laws.107 In pertinent part, the Act
stated:

98. Id.
99. USDA MARKETING ORDERS, http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSvl.O/ams.fetch
TemplateData.do?template=TemplateN&navlD=CommoditiesCoveredUnderFederalFr
uitandVegetableMarketingOrders&rightNavl=CommoditiesCoveredUnderFederalFruit
andVegetableMarketingOrders&topNav-&leftNav-MarketingOrders&page=FVMarke
tingOrderlndex&resultType=&acct-fvmktord (last visited Aug. 31, 2012). The twenty
two fruits and vegetables currently covered by grade standards are: almonds, apricots,
avocados, cherries, citrus, cranberries, dates, grapes, hazelnuts, kiwifruit, nectarines,
olives, onions, peaches, pears, pistachios, plums/prunes, potatoes, raisins, spearmint oil,
tomatoes, and walnuts. Id.
100. There are currently ten federal milk marketing order areas. Marketing Orders,
Federal Milk Marketing Orders, U.S. Dep't of Agric.: Agric. Marketing Serv.,
http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSvl.0/ams.fetchTemplateData.do?template-TemplateD
&navlD=CommodityAreas&leftNav--CommodityAreas&page-FederalMilkMarketing
Orders&description=Federal+Milk+Marketing+Orders (last visited Sept. 4, 2012).
101. Neff & Plato, supra note 57, at 2.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. 15 U.S.C. § 1 et. seq. (2006).
105. 15 U.S.C. § 12 et. seq. (2006).
106. "[T]he Capper-Volstead Act (7 U.S.C.A. § 291),.. .permits persons engaged in
the production of agricultural products to act together in association for the purpose of
processing, preparing for market, handling, and marketing such products. This Act was
enacted to clarify and extend the exemption from the operation of the antitrust laws
which is granted to agricultural co-operatives in the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C.A. § 17)."
20 A.L.R. Fed. 924.
107. 7 U.S.C. § 291-292 (2006).
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Persons engaged in the production of agricultural products
as farmers, planters, ranchmen, dairymen, nut or fruit
growers may act together in associations, corporate or
otherwise, with or without capital stock, in collectively
processing, preparing for market, handling, and marketing
in interstate and foreign commerce, such products of
persons so engaged. Such associations may have
marketing agencies in common; and such associations and
their members may make the necessary contracts and
agreements to effect such purposes . . . .08
Though granting broad authority to engage in cooperative schemes, § 292
of the Act limited this authority by prohibiting producers from forming
monopolies and by dictating recourses should producers so act. o0
The associations permitted by the Capper-Volstead Act were not
compulsory, and so free-riders were able to circumvent the self-imposed
restrictions of the associated producers while taking advantage of the
benefits of such associations." 0 With the 1937 enactment of the AMAA,
however, marketing orders became mandatory when two thirds of the
producers gave their approval."' This effectively eliminated the free-rider
problem.
Marketing orders begin with an industry proposal to the USDA.112
The Secretary must first establish that the proposed order serves the public
interest and then may set a public hearing where all interested parties opine
on the order's merits or shortcomings." 3 The Secretary then approves or
disapproves the order's terms, and in the case of approval, calls for a
referendum." 4 In order to become binding, either two thirds of the
producers or producers owning two thirds of the growing acreage must vote
in the affirmative."5 With the Secretary's approval, a referendum can
terminate an order." 6 The Secretary may terminate a marketing order
without a referendum if the order ceases to promote the AMAA's goals."l 7

108. Id. § 291
109. Id.§ 292.
110. Neff & Plato, supra note 57, at 2.

111. Id.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Once implemented, marketing orders stabilize market conditions by
regulating the treatment of the commodity in the market." Importantly,
the orders support research and market development, allowing otherwise
unaffiliated producers to pool resources for their mutual benefit. 119 These
activities, implemented through what are known as "check-off' programs,
work to increase sales and expand markets.1 20 The programs, funded
through assessments on producers and buyers, engage in brand neutral
marketing campaigns that promote the commodity attributes common to all
brands of the commodity.121
Marketing orders also contain provisions that standardize container
and pack dimensions, as well as provisions that regulate aspects relating to
commodity quality and quantity.122 Quality provisions set size, grade, and
maturity standards for the commodity regulated by the marketing order.1 23
These provisions make legally enforceable the grade standards discussed in
Part II of this Article.' 2 4 The lack of brand identification for many
agricultural commodities on the grocery shelf incentivizes producers to
desire enforceable quality standards.125 In the absence of such standards,
sub-par commodities reflect negatively on the industry as a whole rather
than on the unidentified producer. 126 Marketing orders with enforceable
standards foreclose this scenario.
Quantity provisions regulate and set limits on market volumes and
market flows.127 In the USDA's Agricultural Economic Report: Federal
Marketing Orders and Federal Research and Promotion Programs:
Background for 1995 Farm Legislation, agricultural economists Steven
Neff and Gerald Plato write that there are five basic quantity provisions
found in market orders.128 The first is producer allotment, where market
order provisions stipulate:

118. See Federal Marketing Orders and Agreements: An Overview, National
Agricultural Law Center, http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/overviews/
marketingorders.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2012) ; see also OECD Glossary of
Statistical Terms, Marketing Orders, http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=1624
(last visited Sept. 6, 2012).
119. Neff& Plato, supranote 57, at 3.
120. Id. at 7.
121. Id. at 8.
122. Id. at 4.
123. Id.
124. Id.; see also supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.

125. Neff & Plato,supra note 57, at 4.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 3.
128. Id. at 3-4.
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[A] maximum quantity, ordinarily based on historical
marketings, that a handler can market from each producer
in a single season. USDA determines the total quantity
that will be eligible for sale and multiplies it by each
producer's share to arrive at the allotment to the individual
producer for the season. 129
Producer allotment provisions are rarely used.130 The second quantity
provision is the market allocation provision, where the marketing order
stipulates what percentage of the commodity should be brought to market
fresh and what percentage processed, or the percentages used domestically
versus percentages set for export.' 3 ' Third, marketing orders establish
reserve pools, where producers are required to withhold the commodity
from the market if supply exceeds demand.13 2 These provisions allow the
commodities to be released into the market only once market conditions
improve.133 Fourth, prorate provisions regulate how much of a product can
be released into the market on a weekly (or other temporal) basis.13 4
Lastly, shipping holiday provisions prohibit producers from shipping
commodities to produce terminals during holidays and other times where
activity at the terminal is expected to be slow. 13
Marketing orders' check-off programs, standardization of commodity
packaging, and standardization of commodity quality and quantity
provisions have helped agricultural producers to stay afloat during times of
economic hardship and to maintain a consistently viable industry. Through
the legitimacy granted by the Capper-Volstead Act and the enforceability
granted by the AMAA, producers of agricultural commodities have
maintained levels of market protection and control enjoyed by few other
industries in America's free market system.

129. Id. at 3.
130. For an example of a producer allotment order, see

MARKETING ORDER
REGULATING THE HANDLING OF SPEARMINT OIL PRODUCED IN THE FAR WEST; REVISION
OF THE SALABLE QUANTITY AND ALLOTMENT PERCENTAGE FOR CLASS 3 (NATIVE)
SPEARMINT OIL FOR THE 2010-2011 MARKETING YEAR, 76 FED. REG. 4204 (2011).

131. Neff & Plato supra note 57, at 3. A USDA report put together in preparation for
the 1995 farm bill reported market allocation provisions for almonds, filberts, walnuts,
and prunes. Id.
132. Id. at 4.
133. Id. The 1995 report found reserve pool provisions for the marketing orders of
walnuts, spearmint oil, raisins, and prunes. Id.
134. Id.
135.

Id. Five marketing orders contain shipping holiday provisions. Id.
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GRADE STANDARDS, MYCOTOXINS, AND COSMETICS

Marketing order-enforced grade standards have enabled producers to
preclude all but consistently high-quality commodities from reaching the
market. 136 Grade standards emphasizing cosmetic attributes result in
supermarket shelves lined with perfectly formed and colored produce with
minimal blemishes and variation.' 37 This is good for producers, as
abnormal commodities lacking brand identification reflect poorly on the
industry as a whole rather than on the unidentified producer.138 However,
maintaining high cosmetic standards limits the options available to
consumers, many of whom would prefer commodities not subjected to the
pesticide treatments necessary to produce cosmetically perfect

commodities.1 39
Grade standards overwhelmingly emphasize cosmetic attributes and
largely disregard pesticide and fertilizer use, and so producers are
incentivized to apply high levels of pesticides and fertilizers to assure an
appealing and sizable commodity.14 0 If standards were adjusted to allow a
wider range of commodities to reach the market, consumers could exercise
their preferences for commodities treated with fewer chemicals. Standards
that protect health and safety benefit consumers and are essential to a
healthy food supply. Furthermore, a move to readjust standards to
deemphasize those attributes unassociated with health and safety would
benefit consumers concerned over pesticide residues and excessive
fertilizer applications.
Any move to readjust grade standards must be steadfast in maintaining
standards sufficiently high to protect against the various toxins that pose
risks to the food supply. Long term exposure to pesticide residues may be
an unwise trade-off for the benefit of cosmetically flawless commodities.
Yet pesticide application plays an essential role in large-scale farming
operations.141 The insects targeted by pesticides do more than decrease
crop yield and degrade cosmetics. Insect damage creates conditions where
crops are susceptible to toxins harmful to human health.142 Exposure to
136. See generally FederalGrade Standards,supra note 3.
137. Id.

138. Id
139. A 2008 Consumer Reports National Research Center poll found that 83% of
Americans are concerned or very concerned about harmful bacteria of chemicals in
food. FOOD-LABELING POLL 2008, CONSUMER REPORTS NATIONAL RESEARCH CENTER

at 8, http://www.greenerchoices.org/pdf/foodpoll2008.pdf (last visited Aug. 21, 2012).
140.

FederalGrade Standards,supra note 3, at 7.

141. David Pimental et al., Environmental and Economic Costs of Pesticide Use,
42(10) BIOSCIENCE 750 (1992).
142. AFLATOXINs: OCCURRENCE AND HEALTH RISKS, CORNELL UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF ANIMAL SCIENCE, http://www.ansci.cornell.edu/plants/toxicagents
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these toxins can have much more immediate and injurious effects than
exposure to the trace pesticide residues that protect against insect
damage. 14 3 Permitting variability in commodity cosmetics may lead to less
pesticide use.'1
But it is imperative that grade standards remain high
enough to preclude the marketing of commodities damaged to an extent
indicative of toxin infestation.
Of particular importance is the risk posed by mycotoxins. Mycotoxins
are secondary metabolites produced by certain types of fungi.1 45
Mycotoxin poisoning is termed mycosis when it is the result of a
mycotoxin-producing fungi attaching to an animal host; it is termed
mycotoxicosis when it is the result of dietary, respiratory, or dermal
exposure to mycotoxin-producing fungi.' 4 6 Most mycotoxicoses are caused
by eating mycotoxin-contaminated foods.1 47 In a 2003 article in Clinical
Microbiology Reviews, Tulane University scientist J.W. Bennett and
Southern Regional Research Center scientist M. Klitch described the
effects of mycotoxicosis on the human body:
The symptoms of a mycotoxicosis depend on the type of
mycotoxin; the amount and duration of the exposure; the
age, health, and sex of the exposed individual; and many
poorly understood synergistic effects involving genetics,
dietary status, and interactions with other toxic insults.
Thus, the severity of mycotoxin poisoning can be
compounded by factors such as vitamin deficiency, caloric
deprivation, alcohol abuse, and infectious disease status. In
turn, mycotoxicoses can heighten vulnerability to

/aflatoxin/aflatoxin.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2012) [hereinafter

OCCURRENCE AND

HEALTH RISKS].

143. See generally J. W. Bennett & M. Klich, Mycotoxins, 16 CLINICAL
MICROBIOLOGY REVIEWS 497 (2003), availableat http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
/pmc/articles/PMC 164220/pdf/0050.pdf; see also Aflatoxins in Your Food - and their
Effects on Your Health, Environmental, Health and Safety Online,
http://www.ehso.com/ehshome/aflatoxin.php (last visited Aug. 22, 2012).
144. Lichtenberg, supra note 10.
145. Bennett & Klich, supra note 143, at 498.
It is difficult to define mycotoxin in a few words. All mycotoxins are low-molecularweight natural products (i.e., small molecules) produced as secondary metabolites by
filamentous fungi. These metabolites constitute a toxigenically and chemically
heterogeneous assemblage that are grouped together only because the members can
cause disease and death in human beings and other vertebrates.
Id.
146.
147.

Id. at 497.
Id. at 498.
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microbial diseases, worsen the effects of malnutrition, and
interact synergistically with other toxins. 148
Mycotoxicoses can be acute or chronic.14 9 Acute mycotoxicoses result in
immediate and readily apparent poisoning,150 while chronic mycotoxicoses
occur after an extended period of low-dose mycotoxin exposure.' 5 ' Longterm exposure produces potentially irreversible and lethal health effects,
including kidney toxicity, immune suppression, and cancers.152 Chronic
mycotoxicoses present the principle concern to human health.
The danger posed by mycotoxins further comes into focus when
considering their prevalence within the global food supply; approximately
twenty-five percent of crops worldwide are contaminated with the toxins.15 4
Commodities can become contaminated while growing in the field or while
in storage. 11 Mycotoxins grow under a plethora of climatic conditions,156
occur in every part of the world,15 7 and come in many different forms. 118
However, one thing is common amongst the different strains: the risk of
contamination is higher when commodities are handled or stored in
conditions favorable to mold growth.159
Contamination is most common in the developing world, where
malnutrition, limited regulatory oversight, and handling and storage
practices conducive to mold growth are more common than in the
developed world.160 Drs. Bennett and Klich noted in their 2003 article on
mycotoxins that, "People who have enough to eat normally avoid foods
that are heavily contaminated by molds, so it is believed that dietary
exposure to acute levels of mycotoxins is rare in developed countries."l61
However, certain populations are at risk even in the developed world, such
as those who consume large amounts of particularly vulnerable crops and
those who live in homes conducive to mold growth.162

148. Id. at 497.
149.

Id. at 499.

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 509.
Id. at 509-510.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 499-508.
Id. at 509-10.

160. Id. at 499.
161. Id. at 510.
162. Id. at 499. Drs. Bennett and Klich write that "specific subgroups may be
vulnerable to mycotoxin exposure. In the United States, for example, Hispanic
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The United States' comparatively low mycotoxin exposure rates are
largely the result of our high health and safety standards. Though grade
standards promoting pesticide use are cause for concern, it would be
foolhardy to compromise the standards in a way that opens the door to
contamination risks.
The most well-known and researched mycotoxin is aflatoxin.
Aflatoxins occur naturally and are produced by the molds Aspergillus
flavus and Aspergillus parasiticus.'

Aspergillus flavus is widespread in

nature, occurring most commonly in grains grown under stressful
conditions such as drought or high temperatures coupled with high
humidity. 16 5 There are four major strains of aflatoxins, though scientists
have described more than a dozen.16 6 One of the major strains, Aflatoxin
B1, is the most potent naturally occurring carcinogen scientists have

identified.167
Aflatoxins cause a number of diseases in humans and animals, most
notably aflatoxicosis.' 6 8 Acute aflatoxicoses cause death;1 69 infected
humans exhibit symptoms such as abdominal pain, vomiting, pulmonary
Chronic aflatoxicoses cause
edema,170 convulsions, and coma. 17
conditions such as cancer and immune suppression. 7 2 The toxins often
attack the liver, and aflatoxin exposure increases one's risk of developing
One's likelihood of contracting an
hepatocellular carcinoma.1 73
aflatoxicosis is affected not only by exposure rates, but also by one's age,
sex, nutritional health, and exposure or contraction of other conditions such
as viral hepatitis and parasitic infestation.174

populations consume more corn products than the rest of the population, and inner city
populations are more likely to live in buildings that harbor high levels of molds." Id.
163. OCCURRENCE AND HEALTH RISKS, supra note 142.
164. Aflatoxins in Your Food - and their Effects on Your Health, Environmental,
Health
and
Safety
Online
(Benivia,
LLC,
Mar.
26,
2011),
http://www.ehso.com/ehshome/aflatoxin.php (hereinafter Aflatoxins in Your Food).
165. Id

166. Bennett & Klich, supra note 143, at 499-500.
167. Id. at 500.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Pulmonary edema is a build-up of fluid in air sacs in the lung. U.S. Nat'l
Library of Med., PubMedHealth, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/
PMHOOO1 195/(last visited Aug. 22, 2012).

171. OCCURRENCE AND HEALTH RISKS, supra note 142.
172. Bennett & Klich supra note 143, at 500.
173.

Id. at 501. Hepatocellular carcinoma is cancer of the liver. Nat'l Inst. of Health,

Medline

Plus,

http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/000280.htm

visited Sept. 7, 2012).
174. OCCURRENCE AND HEALTH RISKS, supra note 142.

(last
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Stressful growing conditions cause aflatoxin-producing molds to take
hold in soil and in decaying crops.17 5 In addition to heat and water stress,
factors contributing to pre-harvest aflatoxins include insect or rodent
infestation, substandard fertility, high crop densities, and competition from
weeds.' 6 Post-harvest infestation occurs as a result of delays in crop
The
drying and storage in facilities with high humidity rates. 77
commodities most at risk of aflatoxicoses are corn, peanuts, and
cottonseed, though infestation also occurs in nuts, figs, spices, and other
crops.178 Further, aflatoxins can make it into meat and dairy products when
animals are fed aflatoxin-contaminated feed. 7 9
Though aflatoxins are the mycotoxins that pose the largest threat to
agricultural commodities, other mycotoxins pose substantial risk to the
food supply as well. The mycotoxin citrinin has been found in substances
used in the production of cheeses and sake.'s 0 The toxin has been linked to
yellow rice disease in Japan. '' It has been found in grains such as oats,
rye, corn, barley, and rice, and has also been found in fermented Italian

sausages.182
Ergot alkaloids are mycotoxins that typically make it into the food
supply through breads baked from contaminated flours. 83 Ingestion of
ergot-contaminated breads results in the disease popularly known as St.
Anthony's Fire.184 Fumonisms are mycotoxins that primarily effect corn,
causing stalk and ear rot.' 85 The toxin affects metabolism in animals and
causes esophageal cancer in humans.8 6 Additional mycotoxins include
ochratoxins, patulin, trichothecenes, and zearalenone, all of which pose
risks when introduced into the food supply.'87
Any move to readjust agricultural grade standards must be cognizant
of the risks posed by aflatoxins and other mycotoxins. One commentator
has ranked mycotoxins as "the most important chronic dietary risk factor,
higher than synthetic contaminants, plant toxins, food additives, or

175.

Atlatoxins in Your Food, supra note 143.

176. OCCURRENCE AND
177.

HEALTH RISKS, supra note

142.

Id.

178. Id.
179. Id.

180.

Bennett & Klich supranote 143, at 501-02.

181. Id. at 502.
182. Id.
183.

Id. Drs. Bennett and Klich write that a 2,600 year old Assyrian tablet speaks of

a "noxious postule in the ear of grain," likely a reference to ergot. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 503.
186. Id.

187. Id. at 504-07.
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pesticide residues."188 Lowering grade standards to reduce pesticides at the
expense of increasing the risk of mycotoxin contamination would be a
detrimental move. Standards must remain at a level sufficiently high to
minimize the risks posed by mycotoxins.
A move to readjust grade standards should begin by establishing the
level at which commodities will be sufficiently protected from mycotoxin
infestation and other health and safety risks. Cosmetically-driven standards
could then be lowered to this threshold. This will facilitate those producers
who value the benefits of lower pesticide applications over the benefits of
purely cosmetic produce attributes, thus allowing these producers to deliver
to market commodities subjected to only those chemicals necessary to
promote health and safety.
Some standards correlating to cosmetics also correlate to toxin
susceptibility.189 For example, the standards for fresh apples include
attributes such as "worm holes and unhealed insect injury," "sooty blotch,"
and "fly speck." 90 These standards are patently factors affecting a
commodity's cosmetic appeal.1 9 ' However, these factors are also indicative
of a commodity's susceptibility to dangerous toxins.192 A move to readjust
standards to focus predominantly on health and safety would leave these
particular standards in place.
Other apple standards, such as color, shape, and size, correlate solely
to cosmetics and have no impact on the commodities susceptibility to toxin
infestation.'93 These standards could be lowered with little or no impact on
human health and safety. In addition, many standards lie in the middle,
having less ascertainable impacts on health and safety. Apple standards
such as "stem and calyx cracks," "hail marks," and "limb rubs" likely have
some impact on health and safety;'94 however, the standards are perhaps
largely cosmetic.
Other commodities likewise have both standards
pertaining to health and safety, standards pertaining to cosmetics, and
standards pertaining to both cosmetics and health and safety.'"

188. Id. at 510 (citing T. Kuiper-Goodman, Food Safety: Mycotoxins and
Phycotoxins in Perspective 25-48 in M. Miraglia, H. van Edmond, C. Brera, and J.

Gilbert (ed.), Mycotoxins and Phycotoxins-Developments in Chemistry, Toxicology
and Food Safety (Alaken Inc. 1998)).
189.

FederalGrade Standards,supra note 3 at 12.

190. Id. These attributes are described as "[1]arge punctures, canals, or tunnels,"
"[d]ark granular spots or smudges on surface caused by fungus," and "[n]umerous
small black circular spots caused by a fungus growing on insect excrement,"
respectively. Id.
191. See id.
192.

See id.

193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 13-16.
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Researchers should evaluate whether and to what extent standards
could be lowered while maintaining the requisite safeguards to human
health and safety. Closing the gap between health and safety-driven grade
standards and cosmetically-driven grade standards could benefit
consumers. A lowering of standards without first understanding the
relation between the standards and mycotoxin infestation would be
dangerously premature. Scientists and economists should take the lead and
establish thresholds based solely on health and safety.
V. POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF LOWERING GRADE STANDARDS

While it is clear that lowering standards that correlate solely to
cosmetics would have little to no impact on human health and safety, it is
less clear what effect lowering standards would have on pesticide and
fertilizer application levels. The correlation between cosmetic grade
standards and pesticide and fertilizer application levels is an area that has
been left largely unexplored statistically. 196
Extensive research found no studies evaluating the impact of a
decrease in grade standards on pesticide and fertilizer application.
However, in 1997, economist Erik Lichtenberg theoretically evaluated the
effect of a hypothetical increase in cosmetic quality standards on producer
pesticide use. 197 Lichtenberg showed that a profit-maximizing grower's
response to changes in the stringency of quality standards depended on the
marketing arrangement under which the produce was sold.' 98 He found
that, theoretically, an increase in quality standards could result in either an
increase or a decrease in pesticide use.' 99 However, Lichtenberg indicated
that more detailed empirical analysis was needed to support a claim that
more stringent cosmetic standards increase pesticide use.200

196. Erik Lichtenberg, The Economics of Cosmetic Pesticide Use, 79 AMER. J. AGR.
ECON. 39 (1997). "But even the more narrow issue of whether quality standard and
cosmetic concerns affect pesticide use is hardly a settled question. Evidence regarding
these connections remains largely anecdotal. There has been no rigorous theoretical

economic analysis supporting the contention that quality standards create incentives for
greater pesticide use. Similarly, there is a lack of rigorous empirical analysis
demonstrating that these incentives are substantial enough to warrant reconsideration of
the way quality standards are set." Id.
197. Id. at 39-46.
198. Id. at 39.
199. Id. at 42. "The contention that stricter quality standards unambiguously result in
greater pesticide use holds only for a restricted set of circumstances, namely the case
where produce is sold in mixed quality and no sampling error is present." Id Under
"more commonly encountered conditions," Lichtenberg found that stricter quality
standards could reduce pesticide use." Id.
200.

Id. at 40.
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Unfortunately, a detailed empirical analysis of the effect of an
increase or a decrease in cosmetic standards on pesticide use has not
occurred in the past fifteen years and we are left without empirical data to
support the assertion that lowering cosmetic grade standards would result
in a decrease in pesticide and fertilizer use.201
However, testimony presented to Congress buttresses the argument
that lower grade standards would result in lower levels of pesticide
application.202
In 1992 hearings before the Senate Committee on
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, environmentalists and representatives
from food and health policy organizations asserted that cosmetically-driven
grade standards drive higher pesticide application.203 The groups cited
citrus, apples, lettuce, and celery as crops that would receive lower
pesticide applications if cosmetically-driven grade standards were not a
factor.204 Producers apply pesticides to prevent apple scab and thrips
damage on citrus.205 Neither of these conditions are health or safety
factors. 206 During the hearings, Senator Wyche Fowler cited reports that
claim up to half of pesticides used in orchards are to promote cosmetics,
while more than sixty percent of pesticides used on California oranges are
cosmetically-driven.207 This testimony indicates that if cosmetic grade
standards were lowered, cosmetically-driven pesticide use would decrease
as profit-maximizing producers seek to meet grade standards in the least
expensive way.
As previously discussed, grade standards are minimum, voluntary
standards.208 When grade standards are referred to in a contract they
establish a "floor" below which produce is not acceptable. 209 A reduction
in the cosmetic-floor would not require producers to change their pesticide
or fertilizer application levels, but it could give them a cost-incentive to do
so. 2 10 If consumers are willing to pay the same price for produce that is
less cosmetically appealing, producers would be able to reduce the use of
pesticides that traditionally prevented the characteristics that were
cosmetically taboo, such as apple scab and thrips damage on citrus, and
201. Id at 39.
202. See Cosmetic Standards Hearing,supra note 11, at 2, discussed in Lichtenberg,
supra note 10, at 91.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 3.
205. Id. at 22.

206. Id. at 2-5.

Lichtenberg notes that the Natural Resource Defense Council has

argued that thrips cause scarring on citrus but have no impact on flavor or juiciness.
Lichtenberg, supra note 10, at 91.
207. Id. at 2.
208. Federal Grade Standards,supra note 3, at 10.
209. Id. at 13.
210. See generally Cosmetic StandardsHearing,supra note 11, at 2.
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increase their profits by saving on pesticide costs.211 Additionally, if
consumers are willing to pay a premium for products created in a more
environmentally friendly manner or that contain less pesticide and fertilizer
residue, producers may have an additional cost-incentive to reduce
pesticide and fertilizer application.
However, the potential cost savings may not be enough of an incentive
Depending on the producers' risk
to change producer behavior.
preferences, they may choose not to alter their pesticide or fertilizer
application levels. Uncertainty about the effect of a decrease in pesticide or
fertilizer use might cause producers to choose to maintain their pesticide
and fertilizer application levels despite a decrease in cosmetic grades
standards.
While advocacy groups in the 1992 Senate hearings argued that
cosmetically-driven grade standards drive high levels of pesticide
application, they did not articulate what initially caused grade standards to
be cosmetically-driven.2 12 If cosmetically-driven grade standards are a
manifestation of consumer demand, then their reduction will only
encourage retail-consumers to contract above the grade standard floor.
Grade standards are developed and revised by AMS in partnership
with industry members to always reflect modern business practices.213
AMS indicates that "[any action taken on a U.S. grade standard should
reflect the broad interest of either individuals, an industry involved in
growing and shipping the product, or a federal, state, or local agency."214
Thus, the presence of cosmetically-driven grade standards may indicate
consumer demand for cosmetically appealing produce. In a country where
many end-consumers prefer cosmetically appealing produce 215 , retailers
may reflect those preferences in their contracts with producers by
contracting above the grade standard floor to the level where USDA
standards are today, thus removing any incentive for producers to reduce
pesticide and fertilizer application levels. Additionally, even if retailconsumers accept the less cosmetically appealing produce, it is possible
that negative end-consumer reaction to the product could offset any savings
211.

Id.

212. Id
213. Fruit and Vegetable Market News, supra note 1.
214. Id
215. Chengyan Yue et al, Estimating Consumers' Valuation of Organic and
Cosmetically Damages Apples, 42 HORTSCIENCE 1366-71 (2007) (evaluating
consumers' preferences for either organically or conventionally grown apples to gauge

buyers' tolerance for blemishes and other "cosmetic" defects, this study found that
when given a choice between organically grown apples with surface blemishes or
conventionally grown apples, consumers prefer the conventionally grown apples

because they "look better" even though the consumers understood that the spots were
merely a cosmetic problem and would not affect the taste or quality of the apples).
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the producers gained from a reduction in pesticide use as consumers shift
their consumption choices.
Niche Markets

Though lowering of grade standards will not mandate a reduction in
pesticide and fertilizer use, it could foster the development of a niche
market of "eco-labeled" food. Since the 1990s, consumer food preferences
have been shifting. 2 16 Organic sales increased rapidly over the 1990s, with
annual sales growth of approximately 20% for most of the 1990s. 217 This
trend has continued into the 21s' century as organic food sales have
increased steadily with annual sales growth of at least 15% from 2000 to
2008.218 Organic fruits and vegetables reached nearly $10.6 billion in
2010, up 11.8% from 2009 performance. 2 19 In a study published by the
Organic Trade Association (OTA), four in ten families indicated they are
buying more organic products than they were a year ago. 2 20 Nearly half of
parents surveyed revealed that their strongest motivator for buying organic
is their belief that organic products "are healthier for me and my
children." 2 2 1 One other motivator listed for purchasing organic was
concern over the effects of pesticides.2 22
Many consumers would prefer to purchase agricultural commodities
grown with fewer applications of pesticides and fertilizers. 223 However, the
high prices of many organic crops shut some consumers out of the
market.224 Economic studies indicate that consumers are willing to pay a
premium for pesticide-free fresh product; however, it is not a very large
one. 2 25 Scholars D. Bernard and J. Bernard have reviewed current
economic literature that examines consumers' willingness to pay (WTP) for
pesticide-free fresh produce:

216. Carolyn Dimitri & Catherine Greene, Recent Growth Patterns in the U.S.
Organic Foods Market, U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, ECONOMIC RESEARCH
SERVICE, MARKET AND TRADE ECONOMICS DIVISION AND RESOURCE EcoNOMICS
DIVISION. AGRICULTURE INFORMATION BULLETIN NUMBER 777, Sept. 2002, at 2.

217. Id.
218. ORGANIC

TRADE ASSOCIATION, "U.S. ORGANIC INDUSTRY OVERVIEw", available
at http://www.ota.com/pics/documents/2011 OrganicIndustrySurvey.pdf.

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id.
Id.
ORGANIC TRADE ASSOCIATION, "2011 ORGANIC INDUSTRY SURVEY."
Id.
Id.
Daria J. Bernard & John C. Bernard, Comparing Parts with the Whole:

Willingness to Pay for Pesticide-Free,Non-GM, and Organic Potatoes, and Sweet
Corn. 35 J. AGR. RESOURCE EcON. 457, 457-59 (2010).

225. Id.
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In a survey of supermarket shoppers, Ott (1990) reported
that two-thirds of respondents were willing to pay at least
5% higher prices for certified pesticide residue-free
(CPRF) fresh produce. In a similar study, Misra, Huang,
and Ott (1991) found that of the respondents who were
willing to pay a higher price for CPRF produce, 54% were
not willing to pay more than a 5% premium. Weaver,
Evans, and Luloff (1992) examined consumers' concern
about pesticide use in tomato production and their WTP for
chemical pesticide residue-free tomatoes. Although
consumers surveyed expressed concern about the use of
pesticides, the majority did not report any change in their
buying habits. Of those who did, 41% bought more organic
or CPRF produce. 226
Commodities grown with minimal chemical applications could fit into
a median price range between organics and traditionally grown
commodities. If producers were to market commodities grown with
minimal pesticides and fertilizers as an affordable alternative to organics,
these producers could capture a share of the consumer market for pesticidefree fruits and vegetables
Producers could market commodities grown with minimal pesticides
as "eco-labeled" or "green-labeled" fruits and vegetables. The labeling
could emphasize that pesticide applications were reduced to only those
necessary to protect health and safety, that fertilizer applications were kept
below a threshold sufficient to prevent non-point source (NPS) pollution,
and that no chemicals were applied solely for cosmetic purposes. Labeling
and advertising could also emphasize some of the other benefits
emphasized in this paper: improvements in farm labor safety and
reductions in pesticide residues remaining on commodities.
Research shows consumers are willing to pay a premium not only for
reductions in pesticide consumption, but also for reductions in pesticide
exposure to farmers and the environment.
In a recent economic study,228
a group of economists conducted a meta-analysiS229 of consumers'

226. Id. at 458-59.
227. Chiara M. Travisi, Peter Nijkamp, & Raymond J.G.M. Florax, A meta-analysis
of the willingness to pay for reductions in pesticide risk exposure. 32(4) EUROP. REV.
AGR. ECON., 441-67 (2005).

228. Id.
229.

Meta-analysis is a statistical technique for combining the findings from

independent studies. "Meta-analysis is essentially the 'analysis of analyses'. . .[m]etaanalysis constitutes a systematic framework for synthesizing and comparing previous
research, because it systematically exploits existing empirical results to produce more
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willingness to pay for reductions in pesticide risk exposure. 230 Drs. Travisi,
Nijkamp, and Florax used the observations from fifteen economic studies
that concerned pesticide risk exposure and evaluated how much consumers
are willing to pay to reduce the negative effects of pesticide exposure on
various targets such as farmers, aquatic and terrestrial systems, and
consumer health.23 1 Most of the studies were from the United States and
were published during the 1990s and the early 2000s. 2 32 The exploratory
analysis indicated that consumers are willing to pay for pesticide risk
reduction. 2 33 While the authors warn "that it may still be too early for a
meta-analysis to be able to provide a consistent and robust picture of the
large range of WTP assessments across different target types," their metaanalysis indicates that across varied economic studies,234 consumers are
willing to pay a positive amount to reduce exposure to the risks associated
with pesticide usage.2 35
As the last decade's consumer move toward "green" living continues
to gain momentum, now is an opportune time for producers to capitalize on
consumers' desires for healthier food. "Ecolabeling" could help secure
tangible, financial benefits for producers utilizing minimal pesticide and
fertilizer applications. With the potential cost savings and the reductions to
NPS pollution, farm laborer injuries, and pesticide residues, lowering grade
standards to facilitate reductions in chemical applications could provide
substantial benefits to producers, consumers, and society as a whole.
VI. THE BENEFITS OF LOWERED GRADE STANDARDS: POLLUTION
CONTROL, FARM LABOR SAFETY, COSTS, AND RESIDUES

Lowering grade standards to deemphasize cosmetics would produce
benefits for the environment, producers, and consumers. Pesticide and
fertilizer application are substantial sources of NPS pollution.236 Further,
pesticides and fertilizers present health hazards to the laborers involved in

general results by focusing on a joint kernel of previously undertaken research." Id at
445-447.
230. Id. at 441-67.

231.

Id. at 445-60.

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id. at 444.
Id. at 461.
Id.
Id. at 451-52.
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application.237 Lowering pesticide and fertilizer applications levels would
mitigate these problems. There could also be the benefit of substantial cost
savings. Allowing producers to forego purchasing and applying high levels
of pesticides could potentially save producers money, savings that could be
passed along to consumers. Of particular importance for consumers,
lowered standards could lead to lower residue levels. When considered in
tandem, these benefits offer substantial support to the argument for
lowering grade standards.
A. Pollution Control
The EPA's 2000 National Water Quality Inventory found that
agricultural NPS pollution is the leading cause of water quality
impairments for the rivers and lakes included in the study.238 Agricultural
NPS pollution is the second largest cause of wetland impairment and is a
major cause of impairment to surface estuaries and ground water. 239 This
NPS pollution is caused by misplaced or mismanaged farms, overgrazing,
plowing too often, and excessive application of irrigation water, fertilizers,
and pesticides.24 0
Pesticides and fertilizers cause NPS pollution when they migrate off
the land and into water supplies. 24 1 The EPA reports that "[t]hese
chemicals can enter and contaminate water through direct application,
runoff, and atmospheric deposition." 24 2 Additionally, "[tihey can poison
fish and wildlife, contaminate food sources, and destroy the habitat that
animals use for protective cover." 2 43 Agricultural runoff impedes waterbodies from achieving the Total Maximum Daily Loads of permissible
pollution that states have set for impaired water-bodies. 244 If lowered grade
standards facilitated reduced applications of pesticides and fertilizers,
agricultural producers could mitigate their impacts to the nation's water,

237.

Farm Worker Exposure to Pesticides, Testimony of Daniel G. Ford, Advocacy

Coordinator of Columbia Legal Services, before the Washington State Board of Health,
available at http://www.sboh.wa.gov/Meetings/2001/06_13/documents/Tab 10-Dan
Ford.pdf (hereinafter Ford).
238. ENVT'L PROT. AGENCY, PROTECTING WATER QUALITY FROM AGRICULTURAL
(2005), available at
IS EVERYONE'S BusINESS
CLEAN WATER
RUNOFF:
http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/nps/upload/2005_4_29npsAgRunoffFactSheet.pdf.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. For information on the EPA's Total Maximum Daily Load program, see U.S.
ENVT'L PROT. AGENCY, TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOADS, http://www.epa.gov/OWOW/
tmdl/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2012).
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benefiting both water quality and the life that depends on that quality for
survival.
B. Farm Labor Safety

Pesticide applications pose health risks to farm laborers, and reduced
applications resulting from lowered grade standards would provide health
benefits to these workers. 245 The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics has found
that farm laborers have higher rates of chemically related illnesses than any
other work sector.2 46 Farm laborers are injured because of pesticide spray,
drift, spills, and residues. 24 7 There are primarily three different ways that
farm laborers are exposed to pesticides during agricultural operations. 248
First, laborers are exposed when preparing pesticides for application, such
as when pesticides are mixed or are loaded into the application
equipment. 249
Second, laborers are exposed when applying the
pesticides. 25 0 Lastly, laborers are exposed when working in areas where
pesticide application has occurred. 2 51 This occurs when laborers pick crops
in heavily applied areas.252 Reentry standards set forth in the Code of
Federal Regulations govern how laborers must work around pesticides and
pesticide application areas; 253 however, injuries from pesticide exposure are
still cotimon.
EPA reports indicate farm workers suffer up to 300,000 acute illnesses
as a result of pesticide exposure each year.254 Pesticide exposure can lead
to initial symptoms of rashes, sweating, vomiting, cramping, dizziness,
headaches, eye irritation, and respiratory problems. 255 Severe exposures
can lead to severe burns, permanent blindness, and in some cases can be
lethal.256

245.

See ENVT'L PROT. AGENCY, PESTICIDES: HEALTH AND SAFETY: PROTECTING

WORKERS,
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246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/health/protecting-workers.html (last visited

25, 2012) [hereinafter PROTECTING WORKERS].

Ford, supra note 236.
Id.
PROTECTING WORKERS, supra note

Id.
Id.
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See 40 C.F.R §§ 156, 170 (2011).
Ford, supra note 236 (citing
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GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HIRED
FARMWORKERS: HEALTH AND WELL-BEING AT RISK 13 (1992); ENVT'L PROT. AGENCY,
SUMMARY OF RISK-BENEFIT ANALYSIS FOR WORKER Protection Standard, 57 Fed. Reg.
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Reducing farm laborers' exposure to pesticides would reduce the
likelihood that a laborer is exposed to dangerous levels of pesticides. A
recent cross-sectional study of the prevalence of pesticide exposure and its
risk factors indicated that the amount of pesticides used was positively
correlated to the exposure of farm laborers to pesticides.257 This supports
the notion that reducing pesticide application levels would reduce pesticide
exposure levels, thereby reducing the dangers farm laborers face on the job.
C. Costs
To bolster the environmental and health benefits of lowering grade
standards, a further benefit would be a reduction in agricultural production
costs. Commodities producers spend substantial sums on purchasing and
applying chemicals to their crops. 258 If grade standards were readjusted to
make some of these chemical applications optional, producers could forego
these extra costs and apply the savings to other parts of the farming
operation. Though reductions in chemical applications may lead to reduced
yields in certain crops,29 producer could offset these losses by the savings
from pesticide and fertilizer expenditures. Reallocating money that would
have been spent on chemical purchase and application could not only save
on production costs, but could allow producers to pass some of these
savings on to consumers.
D. Residues
Lowering grade standards could also lead to lower levels of pesticide
residues on agricultural commodities. The Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA) mandates that the EPA establish maximum levels of
pesticide residues for processed foods. 260 The Food Quality Protection Act

Acute organophosphate poisoning can also cause long-term effects, including (1) a
dying back of nerves resulting in a loss of motor function, paralysis, and muscle
atrophy; (2) loss of intellectual
functioning including impaired concentration, information processing, psychomotor
speed, memory, and language; and (3) neurobehavioral effects including anxiety,
irritability, and depression. In addition to the immediate danger of acute poisoning,
many pesticides have been epidemiologically linked to long-term effects, such as
cancer, birth defects, and damage to the kidneys, liver, and nervous system.

Id.
257. Jinky Leilanie Lu, Total Pesticide Exposure Calculation among Vegetable
Farmers in Benguet, Phillipines, 2009 J.OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH,

http://www.hindawi.com/joumals/jeph/2009/412054/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2012).
258. Pimental et al., supra note 141.
259. Id.

260. 21 U.S.C. § 346a(a) (2006).
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(FQPA) amended the FDCA to require pesticide residue levels for all foods
to be set at the same level, thereby eliminating the prior distinctions
between raw and processed foods. 2 6 1 Though the FDCA-amended FQPA
prevents pesticide residues at levels the EPA deems dangerous, many
consumers would rather have a larger zone of safety.262 Many consumers
would rather purchase commodities with as little pesticide residue as
possible.263 Lowering grade standards to deemphasize cosmetics would
allow for lower levels of pesticide application, which in turn would lead to
lower levels of pesticide residue. This would facilitate those consumers
who wish to minimize their consumption of pesticides, regardless of where
the EPA sets the threshold of safe consumption.
With the potential cost savings and the reductions to NPS pollution,
farm laborer injuries, and pesticide residues, lowering grade standards to
facilitate reductions in chemical applications could provide substantial
benefits to producers, consumers, and society as a whole.
VII. THE PRIVATIZATION OF GRADE STANDARDS AND THE EFFECTS ON
CHEMICAL APPLICATIONS

A caveat to the benefits of lowering the USDA's grade standards is
the effect that private grade standards will have on the agricultural market.
In a 2001 article on global trends in agricultural grades, researchers from
Michigan State University and the Institut National de Recherche
Agronomique in Montpellier, France noted a "a concomitant shift from
public toward private standards" and "a shift in center of gravity from
technical norms to reduce transaction costs in broad homogeneous
commodity markets, to strategic instruments of product differentiation,
agrifood chain coordination, market creation and share growth." 264 Many
of these changes have come from multinational firms buying from
producers in developing countries. 265 The grades are often the creation of

The FFDCA achieves this by defining "food additive" to include pesticide residues,
and by assigning the EPA to determine tolerances for pesticide residues on processed
foods. If a processed food retains a residue of a pesticide for which the EPA has not set
a tolerance, the food is "adulterated" and is prohibited under the FFDCA.
Heidi Gorovitz Robertson & Samuel Gorovitz, Pesticide Toxicity, Human Subjects, and
the Environmental ProtectionAgency's Dilemma, 16 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y
427, 437 (2000).
261. 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (2006).
262. See generally Travisi et al., supra note 226.
263. Id.
264. Reardon et al., supra note 4, at 423.
265. Id. at 427.
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supermarkets and large processors who wish to compensate for what they
deem inadequate public standards.266
If domestic processors and supermarkets utilize cosmetically-driven
private grade standards, lowered USDA grade standards will likely have
less of an impact on the commodities markets than they would otherwise
have. However, private standards also have the potential to emphasize the
health, social, and environmental concerns that USDA grades currently
disregard. An example of an international firm adopting such a private
grade standard is Chiquita Brands International, which integrated
environmental and social grade standards in response to pressure from the
Rainforest Alliance. 267 Firms purchasing coffee and wheat from Brazil
have likewise instituted grades emphasizing food safety and environmental

concerns. 26 8
Depending on how processors and supermarkets understand consumer
demand, private grade standards could have a harmful or beneficial effect
on current production norms. If processors and supermarkets understand
consumers to desire cosmetically flawless commodities, private grades
could negate the positive effects of lowering USDA grade standards to
emphasize only health and safety factors. However, if processors and
supermarkets understand consumers to emphasize health, social, and
environmental concerns in their buying patterns, private grades could
reflect these desires and make up for some of the shortfalls of current
USDA grade standards. Regardless of how these trends play out, policymakers should look to current USDA grade standards and reevaluate them
in light of the concerns posed by pesticides, fertilizers, and other factors
effecting human and environmental health and safety.
VIII. CONCLUSION

Cosmetically-driven grade standards likely incentivize agricultural
producers to use pesticides and fertilizers beyond that which is necessary to
produce healthy, safe products. Scientists, economists, and policy-makers
should reassess the link between grade standards and the chemicals
producers apply to crops. However, any move to adjust grade standards
must not jeopardize the health and safety of consumers. Standards should
not be lowered in a way that would put the food supply at risk of infestation
by mycotoxins or other dangerous toxins. Though pesticides and fertilizers
contribute to agricultural NPS pollution, cause harm to farm laborers, and
potentially pose health and safety concerns to consumers, the chemicals
also play a vital role in the mass production of food. Grade standards
266. Id.
267. Id. at 423.
268. Id. at 427.
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should not be lowered in a way that would promote unhealthy growing
practices and risk consumer health.
If standards were lowered, many consumers would still value and
demand cosmetically flawless commodities, regardless of the chemical
applications required to produce such products. However, many consumers
would prefer to have commodities grown with fewer chemical applications.
Lowering grade standards would facilitate producers to create a niche
market of "eco-labled" products. "Eco-labled" products could be marketed
as a less cost-prohibitive alternative to pricey organics. Exploring the
merits of lowering grade standards could prove to be a wise venture.
Lowered grade standards could potentially reduce the harmful
environmental and social impacts of current agricultural practices. In
addition, such a move would give agricultural producers and consumers
more choice in what commodities they choose.

